possible to that for an arbitrary packet addressed directly to one of the router interfaces.
Attacks against the Transport Layer Protocol:
Certain attacks can be mounted against transport protocols by flooding a node with bogus requests, or even to finish the handshake phase to establish a transport layer association. These types of threats are also addressed in Section 4.11.
Force NTLP to Do More Processing:
Some protocol fields might allow an adversary to force an NTLP node to perform more processing. Additionally it might be possible to interfere with the flow control or the congestion control procedure. These types of threats are also addressed in Section 4.11.
Furthermore, it might be possible to force the NTLP node to perform some computations or signaling message exchanges by injecting "trigger" events (which are unprotected).
Force NSLP to Do More Processing:
An adversary might benefit from flooding an NSLP node with messages that must be stored (e.g., due to fragmentation handling) before verifying the correctness of signaling messages.
Furthermore, causing memory allocation and computational efforts might allow an adversary to harm NSIS entities. If a signaling message contains, for example, a digital signature, then some additional processing is required for the cryptographic verification. An adversary can easily create a random bit sequence instead of a digital signature to force an NSIS node into heavy computation.
Idempotent signaling messages are particularly vulnerable to this type of attack. The term "idempotent" refers to messages that